L. R. A. 489. The true rule is that the status of telegraph companies is analogous to common carriers in regard to their quasi-public character, and in their duty to serve the public generally in good faith, impartially, and without discrimination. *Central U. Tel. Co.* v. *Swoveland,* 14 Ind. App. 341, 42 N. E. 1035; *Central U. Tel. Co.* v. *State,* 118 Ind. 194, 19 N. E. 604, 10 Am. St. Rep. 114. It is admitted that public service corporations owe a duty to furnish reasonable accommodations to the public. *Narrett* v. *Market St. Ry., supra.* The dissenting opinion in the principal case held that there was no reason for requiring a telegraph company to furnish change. It was argued that a passenger on a street railway naturally expects the conductor to have change, and that it would result in hardship to the passenger were the carrier not to owe a duty to furnish change. But it is readily seen that the same arguments apply with even greater force to the case of a party desiring to send a telegram. Those in charge of a telegraph office have better facilities for keeping money on hand and can more easily procure it if they find it necessary, than a conductor could while in charge of his car. One boarding a car has just as much opportunity to get the exact amount ready as has a person who sends a telegram. It seems that because of the duty as a public service corporation to furnish reasonable accommodations, a telegraph company ought to be bound to furnish a reasonable amount of change to those desiring to send a telegram.

TORTS—INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT—RIGHT TO STRIKE.—Defendant unions and their members, by agreement, ceased to work with the non-union men of the plaintiff, the end in view being the strengthening of the union. *Held,* that this end was justifiable, there being no indication that the defendants' real purpose was to injure the plaintiff or the non-union men employed, such injury being a consequence of trade competition and an incident to a course of conduct by the defendants begun and prosecuted for their own legitimate interests. *Cohn & Roth Electric Co.* v. *Bricklayers', Masons' & Plasterers' Local Union No.* 1 (Conn. 1917), 101 Atl. 659.

It now seems well settled that a strike is not wrong *per se. Mills* v. *U. S. Printing Co. of Ohio,* 91 N. Y. *Supp.* 185, 99 App. Div. 605; *Grassi Contracting Co.* v. *Bennett,* 160 N. Y. *Supp.* 279; *Wabash R. Co.* v. *Hannahan,* 121 Fed. 563; *Illinois Malleable Iron Co.* v. *Michalek* (Ill. 1917), 116 N. E. 714; *Snow Iron Works* v. *Chadwick* (Mass. 1917), 116 N. E. 801. The present tendency of the authorities appears to support the statement of the court in the instant case that where a strike is primarily for the betterment of the condition of the members of the unions it is justifiable, if not unlawful or opposed to public policy. *Nat'l Protective Ass'n* v. *Cumming,* 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369; *Grassi Contracting Co.* v. *Bennett, supra; Davis Mach. Co.* v. *Robinson,* 84 N. Y. *Supp.* 837, 41 Misc. Rep. 329; *Pickett* v. *Walsh,* 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753; *Cornellier* v. *Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Ass'n,* 221 Mass. 554, 109 N. E. 643; *Snow Iron Works* v. *Chadwick, supra; State* v. *Stockford,* 77 Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769; *Kemp* v. *Division No. 241, Amalgamated Association of Street*

& Elec. Ry. Employees of America, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389. But the troublesome question is to determine what is an unlawful strike, and upon this point the cases are not in harmony. It is generally agreed that a combination contemplating the use of force, threats, or intimidation is unlawful. *Minn. Stove Co.* v. *Cavanaugh,* 131 Minn. 458, 155 N. W. 638; *State* v. *Stockford, supra; Snow Iron Works* v. *Chadwick, supra; Purvis* v. *Local No. 500, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners,* 214 Pa. 348, 63 Atl. 585, 112 Am. St. Rep. 757. Likewise, a strike primarily for injury to others is unlawful. *Grassi Contracting Co.* v. *Bennett, supra; Davis Mach. Co.* v. *Robinson, supra.* On the other hand, it is held legitimate for a builders' association to write to an architect that its members will not bid on buildings if the bid of a certain person is received in competition. *Master Builders' Ass'n* v. *Domascio,* 16 Colo. App. 25, 63 Pac. 782. Several cases indicate that it is justifiable to strike for the purpose of enforcing a closed shop. *Grassi Contracting Co.* v. *Bennett, supra; Garside* v. *Hollywood,* 150 N. Y. Supp, 647, 88 Misc. Rep. 311; *Jacobs* v. *Cohen,* 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 292, 111 Am. St. R. 730, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 280 (VANN, J., dissenting); *Jersey City Printing Co.* v. *Cassidy,* 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 Atl. 230 (approved in *Alfred W. Booth & Bro.* v. *Burgess,* 72 N. J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl. 226; *Gray* v. *Building Trades Council,* 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663; *Kemp* v. *Division No. 241, supra* (three justices dissenting); *Roddy* v. *United Mine Workers of America,* 41 Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126, L. R. A. 1915 D, 789. This theory is supported on the grounds that the securing of a closed shop is for the betterment and strengthening of the union, that a combination of individuals may do what one may do where the act is not illegal, and upon a broad view of the right of labor to combine. The Massachusetts court, on the contrary, declares (though not in any case turning directly upon this point), "that a strike instituted merely to compel a closed shop would not be justifiable on principles of competition, but would be unlawful." *Cornellier* v. *Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Ass'n, supra; Plant* v. *Woods,* 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011; *Reynolds* v. *Davis,* 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457; *Snow Iron Works* v. *Chadwick, supra* (*semble*). But that court has held lawful a strike to force an employer to employ union men for *all* of the work upon a particular building, *Pickett* v. *Walsh, supra,*—a holding that is hard to distinguish in ultimate effect from that of permitting a strike to enforce a closed shop. The position of the Connecticut court is somewhat doubtful as to the legality of a strike to enforce a closed shop. The opinion in *Connors* v. *Connolly,* 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600, indicates a stand against the forcing of a closed shop. The instant case is not necessarily a decision in favor of the opposite view, inasmuch as more than one-third of the men in the locality of the strike in all trades were non-union men, and, in the mind of the court, were a sufficiently large proportion to prevent the defendant unions from exercising compulsion upon the employer.

TORTS—NEGLIGENCE OF VENDOR—Plaintiff entered defendant's eating place, ordered a piece of cake, which had been baked and prepared by the defendant, and, while eating same, bit upon a metallic nail concealed therein.